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RECENT DECISIONS
The question of the right of a federal court to enjoin a strike had
similarly been resolved in prior lower court decisions.16 In the past,
injunctions had been granted by district courts under section 208 when
there had been a strike by bituminous coal workers, 17 a threatened
strike by West Coast longshoremen, 8 walkouts tying up the North
Atlantic maritime industry,"9 and a strike of 1500 steelworkers en-
gaged in producing materials for the Atomic Energy Commission dur-
ing the Korean War."0 Often these injunctions were issued when
impediments to the national health or safety were less substantial
than in the present case. In none of these cases did the district courts
distinguish between whether national safety, national health, or both,
was imperiled. Rather, the courts construed the "national health or
safety" clause in a broad sense. They used the general welfare of
the nation as the criterion for determining whether or not to issue
an injunction.
It is apparent that in its first encounter with this problem the
Supreme Court has succeeded in creating a strong precedent. A brief
but lucid analysis of the "national health or safety" clause was
made by the Court. The majority declared that when either "na-
tional health or national safety" was imperiled, an injunction would
lie. Further, although the meaning of "national health" was not re-
solved, the Court construed "national safety" to mean, that required
to satisfy the nation's defense needs.2' The concurring justices said
that a finding of peril to "national safety" was itself sufficient to
satisfy the second condition in section 208.22
There can be no doubt that the two separate conditions necessary
for the issuance of an injunction as provided in section 208 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, were satisfied. Since a nation-wide strike in a
vital industry often impedes our defense and space programs, injunc-
tions must be permissible under the law in such instances. In view of
this, the Supreme Court's decision is unassailable.
LAWRENCE R. SCHNEIDER
TORTS - WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT WHEN DRIVING
WHILE INTOXICATED
In White v. Harvey,' the plaintiff sued to recover damages for
-injuries received when defendant's car, in which she was a passenger,
collided with a parked truck. The trial court sustained defendant's
16. Ibid.
17. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 89 F. Supp. 187 (D.D.C. 1950),
afl'd, 190 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
18. United States v. International Longshoremen, 78 F. Sup . 710 (N.D. Cal.'1948).
19. United States v. International Longshoremen, 116 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
20. United States v. American Locomotive Co., 109 F. Supp. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
21. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 42 (1959).
22. Id. at 55 (concurring opinion).
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demurrer, and when plaintiff failed to plead further, judgment was
entered for the defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Ohio Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, reversed and re-
manded the case for further proceedings on the ground that the peti-
tion sufficiently alleged willful and wanton misconduct by the de-
fendant, thereby taking the plaintiff outside of the guest statute.2
The Ohio guest statute extinguishes the common-law liability for
ordinary negligence on the part of the driver which results in injury
to a guest riding in his motor vehicle. The statute provides that a
guest3 can successfully maintain an action for damages only when the
injuries are caused by the willful and wanton misconduct of the opera-
tor.4 Further, the injured party must plead unequivocally that the
operator of the motor vehicle had knowledge of existing conditions,5
and allege facts that reveal on their face the elements of the pro-
scribed conduct, or else the pleading is demurrable.6
The problem confronting the court in the Harvey case was
whether the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts showing willful
and wanton misconduct by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged (1)
that defendant knew that vehicles were often parked on the paved
portion of the highway; (2) that defendant drove at a "fairly good
speed" at night, although he knew he could not, because of his intoxi-
cated condition, keep any lookout; (3) that defendant was indiffer-
ent to the consequences of his acts and was ready and willing to take
chances even at the risk of danger to himself; and (4) that defendant
knew that his conduct would, in all probability, result in injury to
plaintiff.
The majority of the court was not willing to state that drunken-
ness and willful or wanton misconduct were inconsistent allegations
so as to require abandonment of the petition. They stated that even
though the plaintiff may have difficulty proving what she had al-
leged, sufficient facts had been pleaded alleging willful and wanton
misconduct to stand against demurrer. Three justices dissented on
the ground that they could not see how one who loses his reason by
1. 170 Ohio St. 262, 163 NE.2d 898 (1960).
2. OHio REv. CODE § 4515.02. "The... operator . . . of a motor vehicle shall not be
liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, resulting from the oper-
ation of such motor vehicle, while such guest is being transported without payment therefor
*. . unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such
operator ... of said motor vehicle."
3. To create the relationship of host and guest within the meaning of the guest statute, the
privilege of riding afforded the passenger must be entirely gratuitous, and no benefit can flow
to the host. Vest v. Kramer, 111 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
4. Vecchio v. Vecchio, 131 Ohio St. 59, 1 N.E.2d 624 (1936) (syllabus 1).
5. Id. at syllabus 3.
6. Vecchio v. Vecchio, 131 Ohio St. 59, 1 N.E.2d 624 (1936); Universal Concrete Pipe Co
v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936).
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becoming intoxicated can subsequently exercise his lost reason by in-
dulging in willful conduct.7
It has generally been held that driving while intoxicated will not
be enough, in and of itself, to justify submitting to the jury the ques-
tion of whether such driving amounted to willful or wanton miscon-
duct.8 What is sufficient to constitute willful misconduct by a motor-
ist depends upon the facts of the particular situation.9 It is such con-
duct as manifests a disposition to perversity,10 and involves the doing
of an act in disregard of a risk known to him, or so obvious that he
must be taken to have been aware of it, or so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow."
Thus, the question is whether one who is under the influence of
intoxicating liquor can possibly act in a willful or wanton manner.
Since people react to liquor in different ways, an amount consumed
by one person may make him drunk, whereas the same amount may
leave another sober.'2 It is possible that one may be intoxicated to
such an extent as to be unable to form an intent to do wrong or devi-
ate from a clear-cut duty,'" and have no knowledge of the risk in-
volved in his conduct. 1" On the other hand, it is possible for one to
become intoxicated only to such a degree that his judgment is par-
tially impaired. Although he may be violating the state statute' 5 by
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, he may still
have a sufficiently dear mind to realize what is happening and to
conduct himself in such a manner as to have a complete disregard for
the safety of himself and others, and be conscious that his conduct
will, in all probability, result in injury to his passenger. Thus, the
court should not have been reluctant to hold consistent plaintiff's al-
legations of intoxication and willful and wanton misconduct.
The fact that one may be guilty of willful or wanton misconduct
when driving while intoxicated does not alter the generally accepted
rule that driving while intoxicated is not, in and of itself, willful and
wanton misconduct.'" Petitions that allege drunkenness on the part
of the defendant will not circumvent the requirement of pleading such
misconduct in guest-statute situations, and should be demurrable. In
7. White v. Harvey, 170 Ohio St. 262, 267, 163 N.2d 898, 901 (1960) (dissenting
opinion).
8. Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N.W. 560 (1939); O'Rourke v. Gunsley, 154
Ohio St. 375, 96 N.E.2d 1 (1950).
9. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
10. Masters v. New York Cent R.R., 147 Ohio St. 293, 70 N.E.2d 898 (1947); Universal
Concrete Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936).
11. Helleren v. Dixon, 152 Ohio St. 40, 86 N.E.2d 777 (1949); Tighe v. Diamond, 149
Ohio St. 520,80 N.E.2d 122 (1948); PROSSER, TORTS 150 (2d ed. 1955).
12. See generally Grimm, The Drnken Driver, 43 OHIo Op. 61 (1951).
13. Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N..2d 122 (1948).
14. Thomas v. Foody, 54 Ohio App. 423, 7 N.2d 820 (1936).
15. Omo REV. CODE § 4511.19.
16. Davis v. Hollowell, 326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W.2d 641 (1950).
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addition to the intoxication of the driver, facts must be alleged show-
ing willful or wanton misconduct. After pleading such additional
facts, the plaintiff may put himself in an untenable position concern-
ing proof. If it is alleged that the defendant was so intoxicated as
to cause him to lose consciousness temporarily, the petition may be
subject to demurrer on the ground that unconsciousness and willful
or wanton misconduct are inconsistent. Should the petition stand
against demurrer, the plaintiff may still have considerable difficulty
in proving that the defendant could form an intention to do wrong,
or to deviate from a rule of conduct.
It is clear from the decision in White v. Harvey that a petition
alleging intoxication and willful and wanton misconduct will stand
against demurrer. Moreover, it is suggested that such allegations are
not incapable of proof where the defendant is in a lesser state of in-
toxication. A showing in court of the defendant's knowledge of ex-
isting circumstances, and of conduct and statements made by him
prior to and after the accident, may prove that the defendant knew
what he was doing, yet maintained an indifferent attitude toward the
consequences of his acts. Drunkenness which has not made the oper-
ator of an automobile unconscious or entirely helpless should not al-
ways absolve him from liability for injury to his guest when the ac-
cident and injury are caused by the operator's act and conduct which,
if he were sober, would evince a reckless disregard of the rights of
others.
MYRON L. JOSEPH
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